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In a financial context, regulation can have two impacts.
First, it can help to prevent financial failures. I will call this an
ex ante, or ‘preventive,’ approach to financial regulation. Second,
regulation can help to mitigate the harm from financial failures.
I will call that an ex post, or ‘mitigative,’ approach to financial
regulation.
Some commentators frame an ex ante/ex post regulatory
distinction around conduct: regulation that targets bad conduct
before it occurs is deemed ex ante, whereas regulation that
targets bad conduct after it occurs is deemed ex post.1
It makes sense to frame the distinction around conduct if one
assumes, as do those commentators, that bad conduct will be
deterred if targeted with appropriate regulatory penalties,
whether ex ante or ex post. In the context of my talk, however,
regulators do not and (I show) cannot know all the conduct that
leads to financial failures. Moreover, factors other than conduct
can lead to financial failures.2
Framing the ex ante/ex post distinction around conduct
would thus be misleading. I therefore frame the distinction
around the impact of the regulation (again, ex ante regulation
focuses on preventing financial failures, ex post regulation
focuses on mitigating the harm from financial failures).
INTRODUCTION
Ideal financial regulation would work ex ante, to prevent
financial failures. Once a failure occurs, there may already be
economic damage, and it may be difficult to stop the failure from
spreading and becoming systemic.
The reality, though, is that preventing financial failures
should be only one role for regulators. Even an optimal
prophylactic regulatory regime cannot anticipate and prevent
every failure. For example, financial panics are often the failures
1 The choice of ex ante versus ex post regulatory penalties will depend on such
factors as the policing capacity of ex ante penalties, the cost of consequences resulting
from the conduct compared with the cost of preventing the conduct, and the ability to
know what conduct leads to bad consequences. See, e.g., STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS
OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 87–91, 428–30, 479–82, 492–520, 572–78 (2004);
Christopher Boerner & Barak D. Richman, A Transaction Cost Economizing Approach to
Regulation: Understanding the NIMBY Problem and Improving Regulatory Responses, 23
YALE J. ON REG. 29, 58–66 (2006) (offering a way to compare alternative regulatory
regimes).
2 And, regulation that helps mitigate the consequences of financial failures, such as
creating financial safety nets, might even perversely affect conduct, fostering moral
hazard in parties that believe they are too big to fail. See infra Part II.A.
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that trigger systemic collapse.3
But regulation aimed at
preventing financial panics cannot anticipate all the causes of the
panics.4 And even when identified, panics cannot always be
averted easily because investors are not always rational.5
One might also argue that some failures could be avoided by
reducing leverage in the financial system. Reducing leverage
reduces the risk that a financial institution will default and also
reduces the likelihood that a default at one financial institution
will cause defaults at other institutions.6 But regulation limiting
leverage could create significant costs. Some leverage is good,
enabling a firm to operate efficiently and grow; and there is no
optimal across-the-board leverage ratio that is right for every
financial firm.7
Analysis of financial failures underlying the recent global
recession further indicates that ex ante regulation cannot
anticipate and prevent every failure. These failures can be
attributed conceptually to at least four market imperfections:
(1) conflicts of interest; (2) complacency of investors and other
market participants; (3) complexity of financial markets and of
the securities traded therein; and (4) “a type of tragedy of the
commons” in which “the benefits of exploiting finite capital
resources accrue to individual market participants,” each of
whom is motivated to maximize use of the resource, whereas the
costs of exploitation are distributed more widely.8 Government
can probably manage conflicts, and it can also reduce the tragedy
of the commons (such as by creating a systemic risk fund to
which systemically important firms are required to contribute,
thereby internalizing costs and motivating a degree of selfmonitoring by those firms—both individually and collectively—
against externalities).9
3 Steven L. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 97 GEO. L.J. 193, 214 (2008) [hereinafter
Schwarcz, Systemic Risk].
4 Id. at 216.
5 Iman Anabtawi & Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Systemic Risk: Towards an
Analytical Framework, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. (forthcoming 2011) (manuscript at 38),
available at http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2924&context=
faculty_scholarship.
6 Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, supra note 3, at 223.
7 Id. at 224.
8 Steven L. Schwarcz, Understanding the Subprime Financial Crisis, 60 S.C. L.
REV. 549, 561–62 (2009) (quoting Steven L. Schwarcz, Protecting Financial Markets:
Lessons from the Subprime Mortgage Meltdown, 93 MINN. L. REV. 373, 406 (2008)).
9 This approach was originally in the Dodd-Frank Act, but it was taken out at the
last minute because of opposition by politicians who believed (in my opinion, wrongly)
that it would increase moral hazard by institutionalizing bailouts. A privately-funded
systemic risk fund not only can mitigate systemic externalities, but also can help
minimize the potential for risky behavior caused by institutions that believe they are too
big to fail. The too-big-to-fail problem is effectively an externality imposed on government
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But government cannot fully manage problems of increasing
complexity, which makes disclosure an inadequate means of
reducing information asymmetry.10
Furthermore, complex
financial markets innovate more quickly than regulators can
adapt.
Nor can government fully manage problems of
complacency; human nature is hard to change, and investors and
other market participants do not (even absent a panic) always
rationally evaluate risk.
Complete ex ante financial regulation, whereby regulators
prevent every failure, is thus a futile goal. And even if it were
feasible, it would not necessarily be desirable.
Ex ante
regulation can provide an incentive for regulatory arbitrage.11
Furthermore, any ex ante regulation that attempts to prevent all
financial failures may end up being too chilling, thereby
dampening economic growth.12 Ex post remedies will therefore
always be needed to try to prevent financial failures—when they
inevitably occur—from spreading and becoming systemic.
Chaos theory supports this type of reactive approach. In
complex engineering systems, failures are inevitable.13
Therefore, it is important to try to break the transmission of
these failures14 and to limit their systemic consequences.
I first will discuss how to break the transmission of financial
failures and thereafter will examine how to limit their systemic
consequences. In my analysis, I stand partly on the shoulders of

(and ultimately taxpayers) by an institution engaging in such risky behavior. A privatelyfunded systemic risk fund would help to internalize that externality. Furthermore, the
ability of government to require additional contributions to this type of fund should
motivate contributors to the fund to monitor each other to reduce the potential for such
risky behavior. The IMF appears to be using the European Commission’s recent proposal
to tax the financial sector as a platform to announce that new taxes on banks [are] needed
to provide an insurance fund for future financial meltdowns and to curb excessive risktaking.
10 See Anabtawi & Schwarcz, supra note 5, (manuscript at 40–41). Cf. Kathryn
Judge, Fragmentation Nodes: A Study in Financial Innovation, Complexity and Systemic
Risk 82 (Dec. 14, 2010) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (explaining why
market observers and regulators failed to observe the “most pernicious forms of
complexity” leading to the recent financial collapse).
11 See, e.g., Samuel W. Buell, Good Faith and Law Evasion, 58 UCLA L. REV.
(forthcoming Feb. 2011) (manuscript at 7–10) (on file with the Duke University School of
Law Scholarship Repository), available at http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/
viewcontent.cgi?article=2943&context=faculty_scholarship.
12 Lawrence G. Baxter, Adaptive Regulation in the Amoral Bazaar 11 (Duke Law
Working Papers, Paper No. 53, 2010), available at http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/
viewcontent.cgi?article=2969&context=faculty_scholarship.
13 Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Complexity in Financial Markets, 87 WASH. U. L.
REV. 211, 248 (2009).
14 As to breaking transmission of failures, see Anabtawi & Schwarcz, supra note 5,
(manuscript at 4).
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Professor Iman Anabtawi of UCLA Law School, with whom I
have written about and discussed many of these issues.15
I. BREAKING THE TRANSMISSION OF FINANCIAL FAILURES
A. Breaking Transmission Chains
Professor Anabtawi and I have recently examined how
regulators can identify and try to break the transmission chains
of financial failures.16
Localized financial failures, by
themselves, are unlikely to produce systemic effects; but when
these failures are transmitted through financial institutions and
markets, even relatively small failures can have systemic
consequences.
We posit that two otherwise independent correlations can
combine to transmit localized financial failures into broader
systemic crises. The first is a correlation between a financial
institution’s financial condition and its exposure to risk from
failures consisting of low-probability adverse events. The second
is a correlation across financial institutions and markets. Using
four financial crises within the past century, we illustrate that
these two correlations have at times combined historically to
potentiate the systemic transmission of localized financial
failures.
Prior to the global recession, for example, subprime
mortgage loans were bundled together as collateral to partially
support the payment of complex mortgage-backed securities,
which were purchased by banks and other financial institutions
worldwide. These securities maintained their value so long as
home prices appreciated, as they had been doing for decades and
as market observers assumed would continue.
When home prices began falling, some of these mortgagebacked securities began defaulting, requiring financial
institutions heavily invested in the securities to write down their
value, in turn causing these institutions to appear, if not be,
financially risky. This reflected a correlation between low
probability risk of failure—that home prices would significantly
fall and cause defaults—and an institution’s financial condition.
The global recession also entailed a correlation across financial
institutions and markets—not only a tight interconnectedness
among banks and non-bank financial institutions, but also a
See id. at (manuscript at 1).
See id. at (manuscript at 62) (arguing that “one focus of optimal regulation should
be on attempting to weaken correlations within the financial system that serve to
transmit systemic risk”).
15
16
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tight interconnectedness between financial institutions and
markets.
These correlations combined to facilitate the
transmission of localized financial failures into a systemic
collapse.
Professor Anabtawi and I recognize the limitations of our
approach: one cannot always anticipate all transmission chains
of financial failures;17 and, even after a transmission chain is
identified, regulation cannot always break it. We therefore
caution that our approach should be only one focus of optimal
regulation.
B. Market Circuit Breakers
Another approach to breaking the transmission of financial
failures, at least in the context of securities markets, is to install
market “circuit breakers.” Although increased speed in data
transmission is generally associated with market efficiency, the
extreme speeds at which algorithmic trading takes place creates
a danger that trading in highly automated financial markets will
sometimes cause pricing failures.
Last May, for example, the Dow Jones Industrial Average
plunged nearly 1000 points in twenty minutes, a pricing failure
precipitated by a trader executing an algorithm to sell
approximately $4.1 billion worth of derivatives contracts without
regard to time or price. In response, the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) adopted a universal circuit breaker rule to
halt trading of an individual security across all exchanges for five
minutes if its price moves up or down ten percent or more within
a five-minute period. Assuming a security’s price has been
pushed below its intrinsic value, a pause should give traders
enough time to recognize the disparity and to respond if they
believe the security is mispriced.
Although the adoption of a universal circuit breaker rule is
intended to increase stability, that rule—like any other riskmanagement strategy—will be ineffective to the extent it can be
eluded by mistake or design. For example, if traders mistakenly
believe that a trading halt is based on fundamental valuation
issues, the halt could aggravate problems. Market circuit
breakers are thus not panaceas, even in the limited securitiesmarket context in which they operate.

17 Professor Anabtawi and I recognize, for example, that additional financial crises
have occurred over the past century and longer, and that a complete study of all such
crises might indicate additional correlations within the financial system.
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II. LIMITING SYSTEMIC CONSEQUENCES
The systemic consequences of financial failures also can be
limited. Perhaps the most important way to accomplish this is
through financial safety nets.
A. Financial Safety Nets
There are at least three categories of safety nets for financial
failures: (1) safety nets for debt defaults by banks and other
financial institutions; (2) safety nets for pricing failures in
financial markets (focusing here on stabilizing price collapses
rather than preventing them ab initio through market circuit
breakers); and (3) safety nets for sovereign nation debt defaults.
These categories reflect that financial institution failure,
financial market failure, and sovereign debt failure could have
systemic consequences.
i. Financial Safety Nets for Banks and Other Financial
Institutions
Financial safety nets can help protect troubled banks and
other financial institutions from default and eventual collapse.
In response to bank runs in the Great Depression, the U.S.
Congress enacted section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act,
empowering the Federal Reserve System (Fed) to act as a lender
of last resort in “unusual and exigent circumstances” to banks
and other financial institutions. Central banks of other nations
have similar missions.18
The primary concern with these types of safety nets is that
anticipation of a bailout will encourage financial institutions to
engage in morally hazardous (i.e., fiscally reckless) behavior.
Constructive ambiguity—bailing out some institutions but not
others, to reduce reliance on bailouts—can mitigate moral
hazard; but it can also lead to potential mistakes, such as not
bailing out Lehman Brothers.

18 Although the mission of the European Central Bank (ECB) is to stabilize the price
of the European currency, in “exceptional circumstances” the ECB may indemnify
national central banks for “specific losses arising from monetary policy operations” taken
for the benefit of the central banking system. Protocol on the Statute of the European
System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank art. 32.4, Dec. 16, 2004, 2004
O.J. (C 310) 225, 239. See also Duncan Alford, The Lamfalussy Process and EU Bank
Regulation: Another Step on the Road to Pan-European Regulation?, 25 ANN. REV.
BANKING & FIN. L. 389, 392 (2006) (“National governments or related agencies, such as
central banks, typically have lender-of-last-resort responsibility for banks operating
within their borders.”);; Steve H. Hanke, Currency Boards, 579 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. &
SOC. SCI. 87, 90 tbl. 2 (2002) (observing that a typical central bank functions, among other
things, as a lender of last resort).
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Although the tension between financial safety nets and
moral hazard may well be unavoidable, the likelihood that
financial institutions will engage in morally hazardous behavior
may be overestimated. Financial institutions can be liquidated,
so an institution that engages in morally hazardous behavior is
playing a very dangerous game. Indeed, there is no solid
evidence, even in the global recession, that financial institutions
have been engaging in that type of behavior.
Lack of evidence aside, because the Fed used section 13(3) to
bail out huge financial institutions, like AIG, through (at least
initial) taxpayer expense, politicians reacted in the Dodd-Frank
Act by limiting that safety net.19 I have serious doubts whether
legislative pre-set limits on a financial safety net should ever
replace the judgment of a government agency—especially one as
independent as the Fed—to decide, in actual context, whether to
extend the safety net.20
ii. Financial Safety Nets for Markets
We need to more seriously consider extending safety-net
mechanisms to financial markets, qua markets. The global
recession has demonstrated that panic-driven market pricing
failures—exacerbated by such factors as marking-to-market and
concerns
over
counterparty-risk—can
have
systemic
consequences.
Experience in that recession supports
establishment of market liquidity providers of last resort to
stabilize market prices.
For example, in response to the collapse of the commercial
paper market, the Fed created the Commercial Paper Funding
Facility (CPFF) to act as a lender of last resort for that market,
with the goal of addressing “temporary liquidity distortions” by
purchasing commercial paper from highly rated issuers that
could not otherwise sell their paper. The CPFF apparently
helped to stabilize the commercial paper market, without
fostering moral hazard.21
Highly publicized recent governmental purchases of market
securities only indirectly constitute safety-net mechanisms for
19 The Dodd-Frank Act limits, among other things, bailouts of individual financial
institutions.
20 Cf. DAVID SKEEL, THE NEW FINANCIAL DEAL 136–37 (2011) (arguing that the
“incentives created by [the Dodd-Frank Act’s limitations on the section 13(3) safety-net]
are not encouraging”).
21 Tobias Adrian, Karin Kimbrough & Dina Marchioni, The Federal Reserve’s
Commercial Paper Funding Facility, FED. RES. BANK N.Y. ECON. POL’Y REV. (forthcoming
2011) (manuscript at 10–12). See also Steven L. Schwarcz, Too Big to Fail?: Recasting the
Financial Safety Net, in THE PANIC OF 2008, at 94, 100 (Lawrence E. Mitchell & Arthur E.
Wilmarth, Jr. eds., 2010) [hereinafter Schwarcz, Too Big to Fail?].
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financial markets.
For example, European Central Bank
purchases of Greek, Irish, and Portuguese bonds22 are intended
to stabilize those nations, not the sovereign bond markets per se;
and the Fed’s purchases of U.S. Treasury securities (so-called
“quantitative easing”) are intended to stimulate the economy, not
the market for U.S. Treasuries per se. We need to more seriously
consider how safety-net mechanisms for financial markets, qua
markets, can control panic-driven pricing failures that can lead to
systemic collapses.23
iii. Financial Safety Nets for Sovereign Nations
Even a default by relatively small nations, like Greece,
Ireland, and Portugal, can have global repercussions. Financial
safety nets therefore should be considered for sovereign nation
debt.
Traditionally, the International Monetary Fund (IMF)
provides this safety net. But the IMF safety net raises various
concerns, including: (1) the potential for moral hazard; (2) the
inefficient use of IMF-member-nation (and thus ultimately
taxpayer) funds24; and (3) the possibility of imposing politically
motivated, sometimes harmful, “conditionality” on nations that
otherwise would benefit from the safety net.
The IMF safety net could also be viewed as insufficient or
even unreliable when a sovereign debt default is likely to cause
disproportionately greater regional than international harm. For
this reason, observers are increasingly focusing on the possibility
of establishing regional safety nets for sovereign nations. In
December 2010, for example, I participated in a high-level
meeting in Oxford to examine how to create a regional safety net
for Euro-zone nations.25 And not too dissimilarly, there has been
increasing concern that some states in the United States, which
have many sovereign attributes, may need financial protection
from default.
Conceptually, regional safety nets should be no different
from global safety nets, except insofar as who provides the
See infra note 25.
For initial analysis of safety-net mechanisms for financial markets, see generally
Schwarcz, Too Big to Fail?, supra note 21, and Anabtawi & Schwarcz, supra note 5,
(manuscript at 55–58).
24 See, e.g., Steven L. Schwarcz, Sovereign Debt Restructuring: A Bankruptcy
Reorganization Approach, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 956, 963–66 (2000) [hereinafter Schwarcz,
Sovereign Debt Restructuring] (demonstrating the cost to taxpayers of IMF membernation contributions).
25 To some extent, regional safety nets are being spun on an ad hoc basis for
sovereign-nation debt, such as through European Central Bank purchases of Greek, Irish,
and Portuguese bonds. But that is in a highly politically visible and debt-specific context.
22
23
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funding.26 For a regional safety net, the funders are—like the
recent European Union response to the debt problems of Greece,
Ireland, and Portugal—primarily regional confederations and
their member nations.
A conceptual analysis of financial safety nets for sovereign
nation debt therefore need not focus, at least in the first instance,
on whether the safety net should be regional or international.
The fundamental problems are the same for both.
The main problem is that a nation that anticipates being
bailed out is likely to engage in morally hazardous behavior.
Nations are much more likely than financial institutions to
engage in this behavior because nations, unlike firms, cannot be
liquidated, and also because governments have strong political
incentives (sometimes augmented by popular uprisings, such as
the riots in Athens) to avoid reducing services or raising taxes.27
Another problem with financial safety nets for nations is that
bailouts are terribly expensive—in the case of Greece, for
example, costing potentially hundreds of billions of euros.
These are growing problems: as global capital markets
increasingly (and inevitably) embrace sovereign bonds as a
financing tool, a country’s debt becomes more tightly linked to
the rest of the financial system, making a default more likely to
trigger a systemic collapse.
The alternative to a bailout is an orderly debt restructuring,
but that is usually impractical for nations because of two market
imperfections: a holdout problem and a funding problem.28 The
holdout problem is that any given creditor has an incentive to
strategically hold out from agreeing to a reasonable debtrestructuring plan, hoping that the imperative of others to settle
will persuade them to allocate the holdout more than its fair
share of the settlement or purchase the holdout’s claim.
The funding problem is that a country is likely to need to
borrow new money to pay critical expenses during the debt
26 At a December 8, 2010 meeting at the University of Oxford, Dr. Domenico
Lombardi, President of The Oxford Institute for Economic Policy, discussed favorably a
proposal by Daniel Gros and Thomas Mayer for a European monetary fund. See Daniel
Gros & Thomas Mayer, How to Deal with Sovereign Default in Europe: Create the
European Monetary Fund Now!, CENTRE FOR EUR. POL’Y STUD., POL’Y BRIEF, May 17,
2010, at 1, 2. I argued that proposal is nothing more than what scholars have proposed
for years in a broader context.
27 The Greek government, for example, did little to impose fiscal austerity even as
debts accumulated.
28 See generally Steven L. Schwarcz, Facing the Debt Challenge of Countries That
Are Too Big to Fail, in SOVEREIGN DEBT: FROM SAFETY TO DEFAULT (Robert W. Kolb ed.)
(forthcoming 2011) (manuscript at 2–3), available at http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/
viewcontent.cgi?article=2950&context=faculty_scholarship.
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restructuring process, but no lender is likely to be willing to lend
such funds unless its right to repayment has priority over
existing debt claims.
Any effective solution to the sovereign debt dilemma would
have to address both the holdout problem and the funding
problem. Given the importance and high media visibility of
country debt problems, let me digress a few minutes to examine
how these problems could be addressed.
Addressing the Holdout Problem. The holdout problem can
be addressed by legislating, through international treaty, a form
of “super-majority” voting on sovereign debt-restructuring plans,
in which a vote by the overwhelming majority of similarly
situated creditors can bind dissenting creditors.29 This is the
tried-and-true method by which insolvency law, including
Chapter 11 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, successfully and
equitably addresses the holdout problem in a corporate context
and achieves consensual debt restructuring.
Because only
similarly situated creditors can vote to bind dissenting creditors,
and because any outcome of voting will bind all those creditors
alike, the outcomes of votes should benefit the claims of holdouts
and dissenters as much as the claims of the super-majority.
The IMF actually proposed, some years back, a sovereign
debt restructuring mechanism (SDRM) similar to this, based on
scholarly research of the problem (including my own research).30
It was never adopted, however, because of political opposition in
the United States by officials in the second Bush Administration,
apparently based on philosophical dogma that free-market
solutions always ought to trump legislative ones. They instead
favored solving the holdout problem contractually, through what
are referred to as collective-action clauses, allowing essential
payment terms of a loan facility to be changed through supermajority, as opposed to unanimous, voting.
There are, however, two fundamental problems with
collective-action clauses. First, collective-action clauses are not
always included in sovereign loan and bond agreements. In the
Greek debt crisis, for example, ninety percent of the total debt
was not governed by collective-action clauses. Second, even if
every sovereign loan and bond agreement included collectiveaction clauses, those clauses only work on an agreement-byagreement basis. Therefore, any one or more syndicate(s) of
banks or group of bondholders that fails to achieve a super-

29
30

Id. at (manuscript at 3).
Schwarcz, Sovereign Debt Restructuring, supra note 24, at 956–57.
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majority vote would itself be a holdout vis-à-vis other creditors.
It thus is unlikely that collective-action clauses can ever
effectively resolve the holdout problem in sovereign-debt
restructuring.31
I therefore believe that an international convention, in which
super-majority voting can bind all of a debtor-nation’s creditors,
is needed to solve the holdout problem.
Addressing the Funding Problem. Such a convention could
also address the funding problem. A simple remedy would be to
grant a first priority right of repayment to loans of new money
made to enable a country to pay critical expenses during the debt
restructuring process. Existing creditors can be protected by
giving them the right to object to a new-money loan if its amount
is too high or its terms—including conditionality deemed
appropriate by the lenders—are inappropriate. (Conditionality
will therefore be negotiated.) Existing creditors will also be
further protected because a country that abuses new-money
lending privileges will be unlikely to receive super-majority
creditor approval for a debt-restructuring plan.
B. Resolution Mechanisms
Another way to limit the systemic consequences of financial
failures is through resolution mechanisms that diminish the
impact of the failure.
An example of such a resolution
mechanism would be a pre-set plan to liquidate an entity or rearrange its capital structure upon the occurrence of stated
events, like insolvency.
Resolution mechanisms are most applicable to financial
institutions. They have no direct application to markets. And
they have relatively little application to sovereign nations,
because sovereign nations cannot politically—and arguably
should not morally—be liquidated.
Resolution mechanisms have long been used for nonfinancial institutions. In that context, these mechanisms are
usually called ‘bankruptcy’ or ‘insolvency’ laws, and they
generally provide legal guidelines for liquidating companies or
enabling companies to reorganize when, at least in theory,
reorganization would be more efficient than liquidation.
(Although I have long argued for a “bankruptcy reorganization”
approach to sovereign debt restructuring,32 I described the core of

31
32

Id. at 960–61.
See supra notes 24 and 28.
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that approach when discussing financial safety nets for sovereign
nations).
There is controversy, though, whether bankruptcy-type
resolution mechanisms are appropriate for financial institutions,
especially when such institutions (like Lehman Brothers) are
multinational. This controversy is not surprising; even in the
context of domestic bankruptcy for non-financial firms, there is
controversy over what should be the fundamental goals.33
There are also unanswered questions about incentives to
implement bankruptcy-type resolution of financial institutions,
especially when the sole resolution option—as under the DoddFrank Act—is liquidation.
Will regulators, politically, be
prepared to pull the trigger? If they do, could that cause larger
systemic consequences, as did Lehman Brothers’ bankruptcy?34
CONCLUSION
Ex ante financial regulation is inherently limited.
Regulation cannot anticipate or control every source of financial
failure. Ex post regulation is therefore needed to help break the
transmission of financial failures and to limit their systemic
consequences.
My goal today has not been to identify and critique all
possible ex post financial regulatory approaches. Nor has it been
to systematically compare ex ante and ex post regulatory
approaches.35 Rather, I have attempted to contrast fundamental
differences between the two, as well as to illustrate how ex post
approaches can—and arguably should—supplement ex ante
approaches as part of a comprehensive financial regulatory
framework.36

33 See, e.g., Douglas G. Baird, Bankruptcy’s Uncontested Axioms, 108 YALE L.J. 573,
576–77 (1998).
34 Cf. Judge, supra note 10, at 83 (explaining why determining when to intervene
can be a “real challenge” for regulators).
35 Cf. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, supra note 3, at 214–34 (identifying and comparing
potential ex ante preventative and ex post reactive approaches to regulating systemic
risk).
36 Cf. John Armour, Bank Resolution Regimes: Designing the Right Model? (Aug. 3,
2010) (unpublished working paper) (on file with author) (“Resolution mechanisms must be
seen as just one part of a larger regulatory toolkit, which contains a mix of ex ante
measures as well as ex post resolution tools.”).

